To what extent does
the Real Madrid and FC Barcelona football rivalry relate to Madrid and
Catalonia’s relationship?
Introduction
One of
the greatest football rivalries in the world, the El Clásico is a name given to
any match between FC Barcelona and Real Madrid. One of these aspects is the
political connotation of this rivalry. The regions which these clubs represent,
Madrid and Catalonia, have historically hostile relations. In my report, it is
my intention to explore to what extent the football rivalry between these two
clubs relates to Madrid and Catalonia relations. I argue that, to a certain
extent, the football rivalry between Real Madrid and FC Barcelona is directly
related to Madrid and Catalonia’s problematic relationship.First, it is important to consider the background of both football clubs. FC Barcelona was founded by Hans Kamper in 1899. It is a supporters’ owned club. This means that there is no one owner. Their motto is ‘més que un club,’ which translates as ‘more than a club’. This refers to the club’s status as a symbol of Catalanism and of Catalan independence.
Real Madrid C.F’s founding is linked to their first two
administrators, Juan and Carlos Padrós. One notable point about these two is
the fact that they are Catalans. This sits uneasily alongside the rivalry
because of Madrid’s clear hostility to Barcelona. Real Madrid was founded in
1901 and is run by their supporters. King Alfonso XIII bestowed upon Real
Madrid their Real status, which means royal in Spanish. Thus, the royal crown
that can be seen in their emblem since 1920.
Catalonia and Madrid relations had always been hostile, long
before Real Madrid and FC Barcelona were established. One notable point in
these hostilities is the fall of Barcelona on 11th September 1714. Philip V of
Spain introduced the Nueva Planta decrees that incorporated Catalonia amongst
other territories as provinces under the Crown of Castile. This ended the
institutions and rights of Catalonia. Other effects were measures being put
into place that imposed Spanish culture on Catalonia and forbid the use of
Catalan. This included preaching, education and courts. This event is reflected
in the FC Barcelona and Real Madrid rivalry as when they face each other, at
the point when the stadium clock in the Camp Nou stadium strikes the
seventeenth minute of the game, fourteen seconds later the Catalan fans of FC
Barcelona rise up and begin to chant “Independicia”. The 11th September is also
celebrated as Catalonia’s national day. [i]
Since 1714, Catalonia has been advocating independence. This
has been signified by events such as the 1932 Catalan Statute, which granted
Catalonia autonomy but Spain soon reasserted its dominance. Presently,
Catalonia is still pressing for separation from Spain. Madrid, on the other
hand, views Catalonia’s possible separation as undermining unity. Today, Madrid
tends to try its best to halt Catalonia’s drive for independence in any way
possible.
The relationship between Catalonia and Madrid
In this essay, I shall examine the aspects of the Real
Madrid and FC Barcelona rivalry that relate to Madrid and Catalonia relations.
One aspect is linked to referees being biased in favour of
Real Madrid during Franco’s regime. One example of this is the November 1966
league match, when referee José María Ortiz allowed 11 minutes of extra-time.
He blew the whistle after Real Madrid scored the game’s only goal. However, not
all referees had been biased towards FC Barcelona as shown by this example. In
the European Cup in late 1960, English referee Arthur Ellis ignored a
linesman’s flag for offside when Barcelona’s Sándor Kocsis slipped through the
Real defence into the box. Yet when he was fouled, a penalty was awarded. This
incident was similarly repeated in the second leg, when another English referee
Reg Leafe disallowed four Real Madrid goals although later, archive footage
showed the referee’s calls were valid. This relates to the hostile relationship
because it shows that the referees, the official mediators of a football match
on the pitch, were influenced by the El Clásico rivalry. Normally referees are
meant to be unbiased in their decisions on pitch.
Simon Kuper, author of Football
Against The Enemy presents an interesting theory about dictators and
football. Kuper argues that Franco, Spain’s dictator from 1939-75, created an
environment in which Real Madrid, the capital’s team, could prosper. This is
because dictators tend to concentrate their resources in their capital cities. Kuper
continues to say that it is no surprise each team that has won the European Cup
from a dictatorship comes from a capital city. Real Madrid won the European Cup
six times during the Franco era. In contrast, teams from provincial cities have
won the European Cup during democracy. FC Barcelona won their first European
Cup in 1992, seventeen years after Franco’s death. [ii]
The di Stéfano transfer saga
The transfer of
Alfredo di Stéfano proved a major point in FC Barcelona and Real Madrid’s
rivalry. Hailing from Colombia, one of the best teams around, Millonarios
visited Spain in 1952. They were participating in a tournament celebrating Real
Madrid’s 50th anniversary. Their star player was Alfredo di Stéfano and whilst
playing his style of football he impressed Barcelona and Real Madrid’s agents
present at the tournament. To illustrate the impression given, Real Madrid’s President
Santiago Bernabéu after a radio interview with di Stéfano said ‘This guy smells
of good football’. [iii]
Both FC Barcelona and Real Madrid pursued di Stéfano. The
player’s contractual circumstances were complicated as he was on loan to
Millonarios from River Plate. Barça’s (a shortened name for FC Barcelona)
negotiations were entrusted to a Catalan nationalist lawyer named Ramón Trias
Fargas who knew Colombia well. Joining Ramón Trias Fargas in negotiating was
Samitier, a former FC Barcelona player who brought along his Colombian friend
Joan Busquets. Busquets was a director of CF Santa Fe, a rival of Millonarios. This
meant that Busquets acted to sabotage the deal rather than secure it. Busquets
issued an ultimatum to Millonarios: either the club accepted a modest offer for
Stefano or FC Barcelona had the consent of the player to take him to Catalonia
regardless.
Millonarios refused this ultimatum and Busquets set to work
on organising di Stefano’s escape. During a tour of Venezuela, di Stefano
stated that he was not returning despite owing the club money. Soon enough, he
was in Barcelona. Millonarios was furious as it was felt that Busquet’s tactics
were bullying in addition to Stefano’s breach of trust by not paying his debts.
The negotiations were complicated further by FC Barcelona’s confused strategy
in the affair. Barça’s then president Marti Carreto interferred in the
discussions about the transfer sum. At one point, Trias Fargas thought he had a
done deal which involved concessions and additions, but Carreto stepped in and
demanded that only the transfer sum be paid with no add-ons or concessions.
Real Madrid exploited FC Barça’s troubled negotiations by
making its own approach to Millonarios. Whilst both Real and FC Barcelona were
negotiating with Millonarios, the Spanish Football Federation introduced a new
law banning the purchase of foreign players. This move deliberately gave the
government the role of deal broker. Barça and Real were told that di Stefano
would be excluded from the ban on the terms set by the Federation: FC Barcelona
would abandon their pursuit of the player for themselves and instead the two
clubs would share the player, alternating between both clubs for the next four
seasons, after which a firm arrangement could be made. Matri Carreto and his
counterpart at Real, Santiago Bernabéu both signed the deal on the 15th
September 1953.
A week later, Matri Carreto resigned. This created a storm
with Barça supporters and in his resignation letter, Matri made it clear he had
been left no other option by the Federation. The interim management board that
succeeded him opted to scrap the di Stéfano deal altogether and Real Madrid got
the player in the end despite having to pay Barcelona 4.4 million pesetas in
compensation. Since then, Fargas had claimed that FC Barcelona were the victims
of a conspiracy between Real Madrid and Franco’s government. The dominant view
in Barcelona was that Matri Carreto had been a victim of a cynical conspiracy
by Madrid to control and manipulate Barcelona’s ambition. In relation to the
rivalry, the di Stéfano affair shows the disproportionate power the two rivals had
at this point. Real Madrid had the unofficial backing of the Franco
administration whereas FC Barcelona was alone up against Real and the
government. This is in addition to a Spanish Federation that may have been
manipulated by the Franco regime in Real Madrid’s favour; hence the conspiracy
suggestions by Fargas could be true.
Spain, international pariah no more
During the 1950s and 1960s, Spain was
being brought out from the cold as a pariah in the international community.
Spain was a pariah because Franco had previously alienated the country from
other nations with measures such as the limiting of international trade. Franco
came to use Real Madrid in an ambassadorial role during Spain’s emergence on
the international scene. The success of Real Madrid - notably winning five
European Cups between 1955 and 1960 - was an important tool of legitimisation
and patriotic pride. For Franco’s regime, as it was associated with fascism,
legitimisation was crucial. This is because it helped shred the image of
Franco’s Spain as a fascist dictatorship. Real Madrid did this by presenting a
different view of Spain through their dazzling football and following success.
Madrid was also used by Franco for diplomatic purposes. In 1955, for example,
Real Madrid played Partizan Belgrade despite the fact that there were no formal
diplomatic links between Spain and the then Communist-dominated Yugoslavia.
UEFA and FIFA, football’s governing bodies, backed Real Madrid in this role as
they had commercial interest in expanding football globally and depoliticising
it whenever politics got in the way. To illustrate this ambassadorial role, Fernando
Maria de Castiella, who served as Franco’s Foreign Minister, said that Real
Madrid was ‘the best embassy we have ever had’.
In relation to the Madrid-Catalonia relationship, this shows Madrid
ushering in a key role in promoting Spain as a modern nation whereas Barcelona
had no such role. Thus, Madrid thrived in this period whilst Barcelona did not.[iv]Real Madrid also had the advantage of the media. Gradually introduced in the 1950s, television was controlled by the regime with nationwide coverage planned and selected from Madrid. Real Madrid was given a great deal more air time nationally than any other Spanish teams and TV commentators were picked out for their extreme nationalism. People often identified with the football team they saw and Real Madrid was the team most visible in Spain under the regime. Only Real Madrid was promoted as Spain’s club.
Cruyff
The arrival of Dutch
superstar Johan Cruyff brought a change in the El Clásico. First, it caused
some controversy. Barcelona and Real both wanted to sign Cruyff. Initially, it
was Real Madrid that had reached an agreement with Cruyff’s current club Ajax.
However, Cruyff told Ajax he would only join Barcelona, threatening to retire
and take the case to court if he did not get his way. But Barcelona had another
problem to overcome. Foreign players had been banned following Spain’s failure
at the 1962 World Cup. The breakthrough came when Barcelona employed a legal
firm to investigate the policy that prevented them from signing Cruyff. As a
result of the investigation and what it brought to light, the ban was lifted on
26 May 1973. Shortly after, Cruyff signed for Barcelona.
Second, Cruyff’s son Jordi Cruyff was born on the 9th
February 1973. Jordi is also the name of the patron saint of Catalonia. Jordi
in English is George. That is the dragon slayer. Under Franco it was forbidden
to name a child a non-Castilian name, so when Johan Cruyff went to register his
son’s name, he was told he had to call him Jorge. Cruyff went ahead and bullied
the registrar into writing his son’s name the Catalan way. According to Jordi,
‘I was the first Jordi officially registered in Barcelona’. This name change
could be a sign of Catalonia getting one over Madrid as a Catalan name was
officially registered instead of a Castilian name.[v]
Catalonia also got one over Madrid on the pitch the same
week Jordi Cruyff was born. On 19 February 1974, FC Barcelona thrashed Real
Madrid 5-0 at the Bernabéu. The Spanish journalist Enric González wrote ‘it was
as if franquismo had come to an end’. In a poll during 1999, 60 per cent of
fans described the win as a victory against Franco. The New York Times declared
that the result had done more for the Catalan cause than any politician or
resistance figure ever could. The effect
of the game on Real Madrid was that after the game their captain Ignacio Zoco
first expressed his wish to retire at the end of the season. However, Real
Madrid did have a chance for revenge at the end of the 1973-74 season in the
Copa del Generalísimo. Their opponents were none other than FC Barcelona. Real
Madrid defeated Barcelona 4-0 and after the fourth goal, Luis Molowny, the
manager made a substitution, bringing on Zoco. Zoco, no longer a regular
starter after the ‘shame’ of the 0-5 defeat, was unexpectedly given the
captain’s armband by Grosso, Real Madrid’s captain for the match. After the
game, Zoco went up and collected the cup from Franco, Zocco’s tenth trophy he
had won with Los Blancos (a nickname for Real Madrid). Zoco comments ‘we got
revenge. It was wonderful. And then it was over’.[vi]
Shortly after the earlier defeat of Real Madrid 5-0,
Barcelona visited El Pardo, Franco’s residence. One director, Raimón Carrasco
excused himself from the trip, his real reason being that he refused to partake
in an audience with the dictator who had ordered the shooting of his father in
1938. Franco praised the Barcelona players. Barcelona gave him the club’s gold
medal to mark their upcoming seventy-fifth anniversary. According to Montal,
the Catalan president of the DND, Barcelona had no choice but to give Franco
the medal as not doing so would not go unnoticed. When a petition was launched
to persuade Barcelona to withdraw the medal in 2003, a commission brought
together by the club investigated and ruled that Barcelona could not withdraw
what was not voluntarily handed out in the first place. This ruling was based
on the fact that when the club’s board returned to the Camp Nou that day in
1974, they did not include the presentation in their Libro de Actas. This meant the record stated that nothing had
happened.
The Movil Movienda
The Spanish dictator
Franco died in 1975. The time immediately following his death was called the Movil Movienda. One development from the
post-Franco era was the fan clubs known as peñas. These developed around
long-standing rivalries between clubs and regional tensions. The Ultra Surs were the neofascist hooligan
brigade that was a fan club linked to Real Madrid. They occupied the south
stands of the Bernabéu, Real Madrid’s stadium, hence the name as Surs means south in Spanish. This group
would shout provocative and often abusive chants at visiting teams,
particularly Basque teams and FC Barcelona. Similarly, FC Barcelona also had a
fan club, the boxios nois who came to
be associated with a violent expression of Catalan nationalism. In relation to
the Madrid and Catalonia relationship, these two fan clubs could be seen as an
outlet for the tensions in the relationship as both fan club members expressed
their hate for one another.
FC Barcelona and Real Madrid both had different reactions to
the death of Franco. Madrid came to be associated with death during this period
as three years later, Santiago Bernabéu died. There was also mourning on the
streets of Madrid for Franco. However, according to Phil Ball, author of White Storm, the death of Franco also
meant that “Real Madrid could breathe more easily and just get on with being a
football club”.[vii]
This shows that Franco’s death was greeted with mixed sentiments, none so more
mixed than in Catalonia. The news of the dictator’s death had been brought to
FC Barcelona’s senior officials by a concierge. According to club secretary,
Jaume Rosell there were two reactions, those who said “Let’s open a bottle of cava,” with other members staying
silent and scared.[viii]
Later that day after the meeting, Rosell and the club’s chief secretary Joan
Granados stayed behind. The two saw a bust of Franco on a shelf of a room often
occupied by Barça president Montal. As soon as Montal had left, Granados picked
up the bust and threw it at Rosell. Rosell stepped aside and the bust of Franco
broke. The differing reactions to Franco’s death by Madrid and Catalonia show
the regard they both held him in and relating to the rivalry, show Madrid’s
close link with the dictator. It was this link that had allowed Real Madrid to
prosper during his reign, whilst perpetuating Barcelona’s discontentment with
the dictator whose regime had repressed Catalonia.
By the time of Franco’s death, FC Barcelona had come under
the influence of the Catalan nationalist movement, under Jordi Pujol. A sign of
this was the fact that it was Pujol’s bank Banca Catalana (BC) that helped fund
the signing of Johan Cruyff. The Catalan nationalist movement often used FC
Barcelona as a vehicle for promoting Catalan nationalism. One significantly
political act happened on the 28th December 1975, when FC Barcelona
met Real Madrid for the first time since Franco’s death. Granados had arranged
seven hundred Catalan flags to be discreetly sewn for this match and in the run
up to the match the flags were smuggled into the Camp Nou. The few discovered
by the police were allowed through, a sign of the changing times. Moments
before kick-off, the Camp Nou was awash with the colour of the Catalan flags; a
sight seen as sinful by Franco throughout his reign. The flags were waved for
each of Barça’s goals during the 2-1 win over Real Madrid. This symbolic act was representative of the passion of the Catalan people in their bid for Catalan autonomy and the release of prisoners. In addition, the act was a sign of Spain’s transition to democracy and towards autonomous regionalism and federal democracy. In relation to Madrid and Catalonia’s relationship, this event showed the extent of the Catalan nationalist movement’s ambitions and Catalonia’s drive for independence from Madrid, now a debate which grips Spanish politics.
Mendoza
The period that came after Franco’s death was also called
the Movida Madrileña. It was the
arrival of democracy and with it, a cultural revolution. These changing times
also affected football. Madrid had a successful period with the Quinta - a talented Real Madrid team -
also known as the Quinta del Buitre, the Vulture Squad. This new Madrid team
was made of local, former youth team players such as Emilio Butragueño and
Miguel González and played brilliant football, winning five consecutive league
titles between 1985 and 1990.
One individual
associated with this period of success for Real was then president, Ramón
Mendoza, who joined in 1985. He was a man who made his fortune in Russia and
had been accused of having links with the KGB, the former Soviet Union’s
security agency. He was a president who had no trouble with TV cameras filming
him celebrating with Real Madrid’s ultras
and chanting anti-Barcelona songs. Mendoza took any opportunity to clash with
FC Barcelona, despite having initially signed a non-aggression pact with Barcelona.
An example of this was when he went on a lap of honour around the Camp Nou
after Los Blancos won the 1989 Spanish Super Cup against Barcelona. In his
memoirs, Mendoza wrote:
“I’d had enough of the fact that they always talked
about Madrid as the regime team: they really wound me up because Real Madrid
have always been a hugely popular team under any regime. I couldn’t accept
their constant envy. They always had the advantage in manipulating (the
arguments) with nationalist feeling. If there was a penalty, a simple penalty,
in favour of Madrid, they would be talking about the oppression of Catalonia,
about the regime team, centralism and the lack of liberty…Madrid and Barcelona
are two cities, two worlds”.[ix]
In relation to Madrid and Catalonia’s relationship,
Mendoza’s perspective is interesting. He paints a view that Real Madrid is
almost like a victim to Barcelona’s advantage in manipulating arguments. This
view puts the rivalry in a different light as it makes Catalonia seem more like
an aggressor, contrary to some ideas that Madrid are the oppressors. This goes
to show the different angles some people can take on the rivalry, as Mendoza
makes an argument in Madrid’s favour although he does state that Madrid and
Barcelona are quite different, like two worlds.
The rise of Barcelona
The following decade, the 1990s, saw FC Barcelona usher in a
period of dominance. This started in 1992, the year the Olympic Games were held
in Barcelona. The Games were showcased as a Catalan triumph since, in spite of
only 18 per cent of the funding coming from the Generalitat (Catalonia’s
regional government), the rest of the money being provided by the central
government in Madrid, polls depicted that by July, 50 per cent of people saw
the Games as a Catalan success. The Olympics also displayed a Catalan-Castilian
harmony, (Madrid being located in the Castille region) this was shown from the
start as the opening ceremony brought Spanish and Catalan anthems and symbols
together. Another example of this rapprochement was the Spanish celebrations of
Spain’s Olympic football team winning gold in the final held in the Camp Nou.
During that same year, FC Barcelona won the European Cup for
the first time and the league which was one of four consecutive titles from
1990-1 to 1993-4. This decade marked the first time FC Barcelona had won two
titles in a row and having won just two in the last thirty-one years. The then Barça
team were nicknamed the Dream Team
and managed by Johan Cruyff. In relation to the rivalry, this period marked FC
Barcelona’s dominance whereas it was usually Real Madrid who was in the
spotlight. This also showed a time when Barcelona was more successful than
Madrid. It also displayed a time when Barcelona’s victim status no longer made
sense, as it was Real Madrid that was struggling in football.
Beyond the millennia
The following decade, the millennium has seen Real Madrid
recover their glory as they won their seventh and eight European Cups. However,
the manager who oversaw this successful period, Vicente Del Bosque was sacked
after winning his second La Liga as new president Florentino Pérez wanted to
establish the galácticos policy which
would see Real Madrid assembling a team made up of the world’s best footballers
such as the French Zinedine Zidane and the Brazilian Ronaldo. However, the new galácticos
policy may had appeared glamorous but it did not lead to sustained long-term
success as after the 2004-2005 season, Los Blancos went three consecutive
seasons without a trophy.
Whereas, FC Barcelona won the league in 2005 and 2006, a
year in which FC Barcelona won the Champions League. This was in addition to
Barça winning clásico after clásico, games in which Madrid was being
outperformed. Summing this up was Spanish newspaper Marca’s subhead in November 2005’s match in which FC Barcelona
player Ronaldinho was applauded at the Bernabéu. The subhead read: ‘A
stratospheric Ronaldinho “retires” the
galácticos’.[x]
Relating to the Madrid-Barcelona bitterness, the first decade of the twenty-first
century showed that footballing success was not always confined to one of the
two rivals, as Madrid had their period of success followed by Barcelona’s. This
period meant that neither side could really exert dominance over the other
completely. This nature of events meant the rivalry could be seen as balanced
for the time being, a state of mind that has never happened before.
Against the backdrop of the el clásico rivalry, the Spanish national team under Luis Aragonés
achieved a first European trophy for Spain in the European Championships of
2008. This achievement was significant, as the members of Spain’s team were
viewed, until then, as underachievers on football’s international stage.
Another notable point was that the Castilian and Catalan players seemed to
harmonise together playing for Spain, a fact that may have contributed to the
success. This may be because the Barcelona player Xavi had a long-standing
friendship with Real Madrid captain and Spain captain Casillas, who had the
respect of the dressing room. With these two men’s influence, the Madrid-Barça
rivalry could be put more aside.
When Spain became world champions at the 2010 South Africa
World Cup, then Barça President Joan Laporta insisted: ‘Barcelona won the World
Cup, only they were playing in the wrong shirts’.[xi]
He had a point, as six of Spain’s starting eleven for the final were Barcelona
players, four of them Catalans. The then Spain team owed a lot to Barcelona’s
model of football as well as its players and the fact that Spain’s success was
considered by some as Barcelona’s provoked a shift in allegiances. Now more
radical Madrid fans as much as the Catalan nationalists detest Spain’s national
team. This aspect goes to show that the divide between Catalans and Castillians
still persists, as some do not recognise the Spanish national team because of
the Barcelona-Madrid rivalry. This was exacerbated with one of those regions’
clubs (Barcelona) driving the success of the national team.
La Consulta
What is now a gripping political issue amidst the el clásico
is the issue of La Consulta. This refers to Catalonia’s
push for independence from Spain as a separate state. In November 2012,
Catalonia held their regional elections for their Generalitat, the regional
government. In these elections, separatists won a large majority, but the
biggest Catalan nationalist party and the president Atur Mas’ (the CiU) had a
poor result as they lost 12 seats.[xii]
However, the November election results have not seemed to deter the
independence motion as on January 23rd 2013, Catalonia’s parliament
approved a declaration of sovereignty. The non-binding resolution states the
Catalan people have a democratic right to decide on their sovereignty. The next step for Catalonia in the referendum
process will be to form a National Transition Council which will conduct
research and advise on the route towards independence.[xiii]
Spain’s Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy and his government have said that they
will fight any attempt to hold a referendum on secession from Spain on
constitutional grounds as under Spain’s 1979 Constitution all Spaniards must
vote on sovereignty. In September 2014, Spain’s Constitutional Court suspended
Catalonia’s planned independence referendum and to consider its legality,
acting upon a request from the central government in Madrid.[xiv]
The date for the referendum was November 9th 2014
but this was suspended on Tuesday 4th November by Spain’s
Constitutional Court as the Spanish government thought it was to get around the
September suspension as it was called a "consultation of citizens" by
Catalonia's regional government.[xv]
However, on November 9th, Catalonia held an informal vote on
independence with around 2 million people voting and opinion polls suggest 80%
of people want an official referendum with about 50% in favour of independence.
The Catalan National Assembly pressure group collected signatures at polling
stations on a petition to be sent to the UN and the European Commission asking
for help to convince Spain to allow an official referendum.[xvi]
For now, the FC Barcelona-Real Madrid rivalry will continue,
but the effects of La Consulta on the
el clásico could be that the bad
blood intensifies as the fixture could once again become more politicised. The
games could increasingly become, as a consequence, an outlet for radical fans
to deliver their views. Alternatively, if Catalonia separated from Spain, it
could mean FC Barcelona may have to leave La Liga as Catalonia could set up its
own league, which could mean the el
clásico ceases to be a football match.
Conclusion
The intention of this piece has been to evaluate, to a
certain extent, the football rivalry between Real Madrid and FC Barcelona and
how it relates to Madrid and Catalonia’s problematic relationship. One reason
for this link is that the el clásico
has come to reflect Madrid and Catalonia’s relationship over time. For example,
when Franco reigned and as a result Real Madrid became dominant due to the
dictator’s association with Los Blancos, it was Real Madrid that benefitted the
most out of the two football rivals as shown by the di Stéfano transfer. This
showed a time when Madrid was more dominant in their relations with Catalonia
partly because of football matters. On the other hand, FC Barcelona had also
prospered when the relationship favoured Catalonia, as it did in the 1990s,
when Catalonia held the Olympic Games and the region prospered, so too did FC
Barcelona as they won several trophies in that decade.
We can also conclude that another reason why the football
rivalry is so important to Madrid-Catalonia relations is that events on the
pitch have had the ability to shape the relationship. For example, Barça’s 5-0
win over Real Madrid in 1974 was seen by some people as a symbolic win over
Franco and a victory for Catalonia. This means that events on the pitch can
have the ability to affect Catalan-Castilian relations so the football rivalry
cannot often be separated from the hostile tensions between the two regions.
This may be because the fixture has come to be politicised
as significant events on the pitch come to be meaningful in the rivalry, which
means that the football cannot be separated from the politics of Madrid-Catalan
relations. Another example of this mix between politics and football is
embodied in the two football clubs’ peñas, as both fan clubs became a channel
for expressing tensions within the rivalry and both fan clubs had distinct
political ideologies. To this day, chants against the opposing team during el clásico have strong political
connotations, and the fans do not hold back their negative sentiments.
As a result of subsequent politicisation, the Real Madid
versus FC Barcelona game has come to embody the Catalonia versus Madrid agenda.
In the light of everything I have discussed, I conclude that, to a certain
extent, the football rivalry between Real Madrid and FC Barcelona does relate
to Madrid and Catalonia’s problematic relationship.
[i] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/29/fc-barcelona-catalan-independence_n_2038634.html
[ii]
El Clásico, Barcelona v Real Madrid: Football’s Greatest Rivalry, Chapter 2,
page 37
[iii] Barça,
A People’s Passion, Chapter 8, page 155
[iv] Barça,
A People’s Passion, Chapter 8, page 164
[v]
Fear and Loathing in La Liga, Barcelona vs Real Madrid, Chapter 13, page 228
[vi] Fear
and Loathing in La Liga, Barcelona vs Real Madrid, Chapter 13, page 246
[vii]
White Storm, 100 Years of Real Madrid, Chapter 8, page 165
[viii]
Barça, A People’s Passion,
Chapter 11, page 217
[ix] Fear
and Loathing in La Liga, Barcelona vs Real Madrid, Chapter 14, page 268
[x] Fear
and Loathing in La Liga, Barcelona vs Real Madrid, Chapter 18, page 364
[xi] Fear
and Loathing in La Liga, Barcelona vs Real Madrid, Chapter 19, page 374
[xii] http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/11/26/so_was_catalonias_election_good_or_bad_for_separatists
[xiii]
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/thomson-reuters/130123/catalan-lawmakers-pass-resolution-sovereignty
[xv] http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/11/04/uk-spain-catalonia-vote-idUKKBN0IO14U20141104
[xvi] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-29982960
